From Pluralism to Consensus in Beginning-of-Life Debates: Does Contemporary Natural Law Theory Offer a Way Forward?

A rather commonplace observation about contemporary moral discourse is that while there seems to be at least some settled ground at the level of general principles (see e.g. the UN Charter of Human Rights) significant disagreements emerge as attention turns to certain concrete practices. Among these morally contested practices are many that concern human beings at their earliest stages of life. Producing and consuming human embryos in biomedical research, prenatal genetic screening and editing in assisted-reproduction projects and euthanizing suffering and defective newborns are some of the practices whose moral legitimacy is a matter of dispute. Related debates concerning the moral status of human embryos, fetuses, and newborns, and the issue of the obligations that others (parents, researchers, political, and communities) have to them, also go on and on. The persistence of disagreement in this area may lead one to conclude that resolution is beyond the reach of our morally serious but pluralistic community. This article offers a case that this conclusion is not (yet) warranted because there is good reason to believe that contemporary Natural Law theory offers a not-yet-exhausted way forward toward consensus on at least some morally contested beginning-of-life practices.

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