Fünf Briefe von Husserl an Karl Groos zwischen 1907–1912
2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM
David Carr, Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World
2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM
M. Wehrle: Horizonte der Aufmerksamkeit. Entwurf einer Dynamischen Konzeption der Aufmerksamkeit aus Phänomenologischer und Kognitionspsychologischer Sicht
2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM
The Evolution and Implications of Husserl’s Account of the Imagination
2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM
Abstract
This paper examines the phenomenological considerations which govern an important transition in the thought of Edmund Husserl, namely his gradual disenchantment with the view that acts of the imagination are given to consciousness in the manner of a semblance, and his decision to replace it with the view that they should more accurately be understood to be reproductions of non-posited perceptions. The central conclusion of this paper will be that the logic of Husserl’s own analysis points to a further phenomenological discovery that Husserl himself does not fully articulate, but which helps to explain his initial attraction toward an imagistic account of imagining. This is the finding that a structure homologous to picture-consciousness is liable to arise in the context of nested reproductions, and in particular that acts of remembering imagining bear the act-character of pictoriality.Der Ursprung des Akts. Husserls Begriff der genetischen Phänomenologie und die Frage nach der Weltkonstitution
2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM
Abstract
The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of genetic phenomenology while trying to demonstrate that its elaboration leads Husserl to dismiss de facto the main motivation of his idealism—namely the idea that at the basis of constitution is an immanent and formless stuff shaped or animated by subjective acts. Indeed genetic analysis shows that the original stuff of constitution consists of sensuous contents structured according to a material lawfulness grounded on their peculiarity. By affecting the subject, such contents motivate the performing of intentional acts and are the genuine motor of constitution. The genetic ground of apperceptions is thus material content.Edmund Husserl: Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1937). Husserliana XLII. Rochus Sowa and Thomas Vongehr (eds.)
2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM
Joona Taipale, Phenomenology and Embodiment: Husserl and the Constitution of Subjectivity
2015-07-01 03:00:00 AM
Jensen, Rasmus Thybo and Dermot Moran (Eds.): The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity . Springer, Dordrecht, 2013 (Contributions to Phenomenology, Volume 71), XXXIX + 356 pp. US-$129, €96 (hardbound), ISBN: 978-3-319-01615-3
2015-07-01 03:00:00 AM
László Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit: Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik
2015-07-01 03:00:00 AM
Peter R. Costello: Layers in Husserl’s Phenomenology. On Meaning and Intersubjectivity
2015-07-01 03:00:00 AM
Lee Hardy, Nature’s Suit. Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy of the Physical Sciences
2015-07-01 03:00:00 AM
Courtine, Jean-François: Archéo-logique . Husserl , Heidegger, Patočka
2015-07-01 03:00:00 AM
On Husserl’s Alleged Cartesianism and Conjunctivism: A Critical Reply to Claude Romano
2015-07-01 03:00:00 AM
Abstract
In this paper I criticize Claude Romano’s recent characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology as a form of Cartesianism. Contra Romano, Husserl is not committed to the view that since individual things in the world are dubitable, then the world as a whole is dubitable. On the contrary, for Husserl doubt is a merely transitional phenomenon which can only characterize a temporary span of experience. Similarly, illusion is not a mode of experience in its own right but a retrospective way of characterizing a span of experience. Therefore, Husserl cannot be plausibly characterized as either a disjunctivist or a conjunctivist. The common premise of both theories – namely, that perception and illusion are two classes of conscious acts standing on equal footing – is phenomenologically unsound. I propose to call Husserl’s theory a hermeneutical theory of perception, i.e., one that interprets perception as a temporal and self-correcting process. In the last part of the paper I argue that Husserl’s positive appraisal of Cartesian doubt is only pedagogical in nature. Husserl does not take Cartesian doubt to be practicable, but the attempt to doubt universally has the positive effect of revealing transcendental subjectivity as the subject matter of phenomenology.Was hat Husserl in Wien außerhalb von Brentanos Philosophie gelernt? Über die Einflüsse auf den frühen Husserl jenseits von Brentano und Bolzano
2015-07-01 03:00:00 AM
Abstract
Husserl has undoubtedly considered himself being influenced by Brentano, but his conflicts with the orthodox core of the School of Brentano raise the question whether his adherence to Brentano suffices to adequately grasp the context of his early philosophy. I investigate the biographical details of Husserl’s studies in Vienna to uncover hitherto unknown ties between Husserl and Austrian philosophers outside the School of Brentano. Already during his secondary school studies in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Husserl was exposed to the philosophy textbooks of Gustav Adolf Lindner; and archival records of the University of Vienna show that he had extensively attended philosophy courses held by other philosophers, especially by Robert Zimmermann. Both Lindner and Zimmermann proposed Herbartian philosophies, and what makes Zimmermann especially interesting is that he had once been a close personal disciple of Bernard Bolzano. I use an unpublished lecture transcript, written by a fellow student of Husserl, to investigate the controversial issue of Zimmermann’s possible transmission of Bolzano’s ideas. While a direct transmission seems improbable, my investigation uncovers a plethora of Herbartian influences, which are interesting on their own terms and have not only furnished Husserl with important parts of his descriptive psychological toolbox but have also helped him navigate the Brentano-School’s debate on intentionality.A Letter from Edmund Husserl to Franz Brentano from 29 XII 1889
2015-04-01 02:00:00 AM
Abstract
Among the correspondence between Husserl and Brentano kept at the Houghton Library of Harvard University there is a letter from Husserl to Brentano from 29 XII 1889, whose contents were completely unknown until now. The letter is of some significance, both historically as well as systematically for Husserl’s early development, painting a vivid picture of his relation and indebtedness to his teacher Franz Brentano. As in his letter to Stumpf from February 1890, Husserl describes the issues he had encountered during the elaboration of his habilitation work into the Philosophy of Arithmetic, but also announces that he has finally found "clarity" regarding thearithmetica universalis.Alessandro Salice (Ed.), Intentionality. Historical and Systematic Perspectives . With a foreword by John R. Searle
2015-04-01 02:00:00 AM
Neal DeRoo: Futurity in Phenomenology: Promise and Method in Husserl, Levinas, and Derrida
2015-04-01 02:00:00 AM
Cairns, Dorion: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl
2015-04-01 02:00:00 AM
Hat Husserl eine konsistente Theorie des Willens? Das Willensbewusstsein in der statischen und der genetischen Phänomenologie
2015-04-01 02:00:00 AM
Abstract
This article raises the question of whether there is one consistent theory of volitional acts in Husserl’s writings. The question arises because Husserl approaches volitional consciousness in his static and his genetic phenomenology rather differently. Static phenomenology understands acts of willing as complex, higher-order phenomena that are founded in both intellectual and emotional acts; while genetic phenomenology describes them as passively motivated phenomena that are implicitly predelineated in feelings, instincts, and drives, which always already include a characteristic element of striving. Thus, according to genetic phenomenology, volitional acts are not founded on intellectual and emotional acts but rather influence those acts in their specific directedness. This article critically investigates four possible attempts to unite the two phenomenological approaches consistently and concludes that all these attempts are burdened with unsolved problems. It thus remains questionable whether Husserl has one consistent theory of volitional acts.“Feelings as the Motor of Perception”? The Essential Role of Interest for Intentionality
2015-04-01 02:00:00 AM
Abstract
Husserl seldom refers to feelings, and when he does, he mainly focuses on their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of value apprehension (Melle 2012). This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings in Husserl from a different angle. For this purpose it makes a detour through Husserl’s early account of attention. In a text from 1898 on attention the aspect of interest, which is said to have a basis in feeling, plays an essential role. Although Husserl argues here that every specific interest is dependent on an objectifying act of perception, he at the same time states that every act of perception necessarily has to be accompanied by an interest of some sort. In the latter sense, the genuine motivational force and necessity of this feeling aspect, namely interest, is emphasized. This ambiguity – or even contradiction – shall be the point of departure for the following considerations. The paper argues that it is possible to interpret the role of feelings in intentionality in a different way, namely not as an effect of current perception but as a cause of further perceptions. This tendency is first indicated in the text from 1898 and elaborated further in Husserl’s genetic approach in Experience and Judgment. In Experience and Judgment Husserl develops a broader notion of interest, defining it as a general perceptual drive. This general drive (as a general interest in perceiving) – so the paper will argue – expresses itself in concrete perception as a specific preference: it discloses or makes manifest what is relevant for an individual subject at a given time.
Τρίτη 29 Σεπτεμβρίου 2015
Husserl Studies
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