Η Αθηνά, κατά την Ελληνική μυθολογία, ήταν η θεά της σοφίας, της στρατηγικής και του πολέμου. Παλαιότεροι τύποι του ονόματος της θεάς ήταν οι τύποι Ἀθάνα (δωρικός) και Ἀθήνη, το δε όνομα Ἀθηνᾶ, που τελικά επικράτησε, προέκυψε από το επίθετο Ἀθαναία, που συναιρέθηκε σε Ἀθηνάα > Ἀθηνᾶ. Στον πλατωνικό Κρατύλο το όνομα Αθηνά ετυμολογείται από το Α-θεο-νόα ή Η-θεο-νόα, δηλαδή η νόηση του Θεού (Κρατυλ. 407b), αλλά η εξήγηση αυτή είναι παρετυμολογική.
This issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy assesses the deep and abiding tensions that exist among the competing epistemic perspectives that bear on medicine and morality. Concepts of health and disease, as well as the theoretical framing of medical ethics and health care policy, intersect with an overlapping set of culturally situated communities (scientific, political, moral, and religious), striving to understand and manipulate the world in ways that each finds explanatory, appropriate, or otherwise befitting. The articles explore the complexities of framing public health care policy to guide bioethical decision making in the face of the plurality of ethical viewpoints and moral rationalities—including health enhancing supplements, continuous sedation until death, medical futility, the protection of vulnerable populations, and competing professional obligations.
It is an imperative within health care, medicine, and public health to restore, preserve, and enhance health. Therefore, it is important to determine what kinds of enhancement are increases in health and what kinds are not. Taking as its point of departure two conceptions of health, namely, "manifest health" and "fundamental health," the paper discusses various means used to enhance ability and well-being, and if those means, such as wheelchairs, implants, medicines, stimulants, or narcotics, enhance health. The fact that some means that enhance ability or well-being are not usually considered health enhancing, for example, narcotics, constitutes a problem. The paper ends with a discussion of some suggestions about how to distinguish between those enhancements that are health related and those that are not. One plausible idea holds that an enhancement is health related when the substance, or aid, increases ability or well-being, is integrated into the body, and does not harm the individual’s fundamental health.
Narrative medicine is predicated on the importance of narrative to human life. Although that in itself is not controversial, an extension of this principle that has sprung up in narrative psychiatry—namely, that by coming to imagine a different life story one can become a different person—ought to be. One reason one cannot remake one’s life in the image of a story is that life is not to be mistaken for a story in the first place. The seminal study of psychotherapy, Persuasion and Healing, although recommending that the demoralized absorb more uplifting stories about themselves, appears to recognize some limit to the possibility of modeling life on story. The same study likens therapeutic stories to placebos, but as it happens, placebos themselves have their limits, alleviating symptoms but not curing or "healing." In order for someone to become a different person through the agency of the placebo effect, it would have to be more robust than it is. The argument that life follows narrative is an ironic one for a discipline devoted to narrative to make, given the salience in the tradition of the novel, from Don Quixote forward, of works that explore the fallacies of that presumption. In keeping with its attention to narrative, this article challenges the use of a short story by Chitra Divakaruni as an illustration of the principles of narrative psychiatry.
Raho, J. A., Miccinesi, G., 2015-09-09 15:46:14 PM
Patients who are imminently dying sometimes experience symptoms refractory to traditional palliative interventions, and in rare cases, continuous sedation is offered. Samuel H. LiPuma, in a recent article in this Journal, argues that continuous sedation until death is equivalent to physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia based on a higher brain neocortical definition of death. We contest his position that continuous sedation involves killing and offer four objections to the equivalency thesis. First, sedation practices are proportional in a way that physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia is not. Second, continuous sedation may not entirely abolish consciousness. Third, LiPuma’s particular version of higher brain neocortical death relies on an implausibly weak construal of irreversibility—a position that is especially problematic in the case of continuous sedation. Finally, we explain why continuous sedation until death is not functionally equivalent to neocortical death and, hence, physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia. Concluding remarks review the differences between these two end-of-life practices.
In this essay I examine the formal structure of the concept of futility, enabling identification of the appropriate roles played by patient, professional, and society. I argue that the concept of futility does not justify unilateral decisions to forego life-sustaining medical treatment over patient or legitimate surrogate objection, even when futility is determined by a process or subject to ethics committee review. Furthermore, I argue for a limited positive ethical obligation on the part of health care professionals to assist patients in achieving certain restricted goals, including the preservation of life, even in circumstances in which most would agree that that life is of no benefit to the patient. Finally, I address the objection that professional integrity overrides this limited obligation and find the objection unconvincing. In short, my aim in this essay is to see the concept of futility finally buried, once and for all.
There is wide agreement that communities in lower-income countries should benefit when they participate in multinational research. Debate now focuses on how and to what extent these communities should benefit. This debate has identified compelling reasons to reject the claim that whatever benefits a community agrees to accept are necessarily fair. Yet, those who conduct clinical research may conclude from this rejection that there is no reason to involve communities in the process of deciding how they benefit. Against this possibility, the present manuscript argues that involving host communities in this process helps to promote four important goals: (1) protecting host communities, (2) respecting host communities, (3) promoting transparency, and (4) enhancing social value.
Ferracioli, L., De Lora, P., 2015-09-09 15:46:14 PM
In this essay, we focus on the moral justification of a highly controversial measure to redress medical brain drain: the duty to stay. We argue that the moral justification for this duty lies primarily in the fact that medical students impose high risks on their fellow citizens while receiving their medical training, which in turn gives them a reciprocity-based reason to temporarily prioritize the medical needs of their fellow citizens.
Απαντάται για πρώτη φορά στην Ιλιάδα (0-412) : ''...που με την ορμηνία της Αθηνάς κατέχει καλά την τέχνη του όλη...'' .. Η αρχική λοιπόν σημασία της λέξης δηλώνει την ΓΝΩΣΗ και την τέλεια ΚΑΤΟΧΗ οποιασδήποτε τέχνης. .. Κατά τον Ησύχιο σήμαινε την τέχνη των μουσικών και των ποιητών. Αργότερα,διευρύνθηκε η σημασία της και δήλωνε : την βαθύτερη κατανόηση των πραγμάτων και την υψηλού επιπέδου ικανότητα αντιμετώπισης και διευθέτησης των προβλημάτων της ζωής. .. Δεν είναι προ'ι'όν μάθησης αλλά γνώση πηγαία που αναβρύζει από την πνευματικότητα του κατόχου της. "ΣΟΦΟΣ Ο ΠΟΛΛΑ ΕΙΔΩΣ" λέει ο Πίνδαρος ..
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