Η Αθηνά, κατά την Ελληνική μυθολογία, ήταν η θεά της σοφίας, της στρατηγικής και του πολέμου. Παλαιότεροι τύποι του ονόματος της θεάς ήταν οι τύποι Ἀθάνα (δωρικός) και Ἀθήνη, το δε όνομα Ἀθηνᾶ, που τελικά επικράτησε, προέκυψε από το επίθετο Ἀθαναία, που συναιρέθηκε σε Ἀθηνάα > Ἀθηνᾶ. Στον πλατωνικό Κρατύλο το όνομα Αθηνά ετυμολογείται από το Α-θεο-νόα ή Η-θεο-νόα, δηλαδή η νόηση του Θεού (Κρατυλ. 407b), αλλά η εξήγηση αυτή είναι παρετυμολογική.
By reflecting on evidence we do not have, we gain insight into the epistemic status of beliefs concerning difficult and disputed matters. The arguments offer a novel kind of skeptical challenge, because awareness of unpossessed evidence sometimes undermines rational belief.
Let an X/Y distinction be a distinction between kinds of properties, such as the distinctions between qualitative and non-qualitative, intrinsic and extrinsic, perfectly natural and less-than-perfectly natural or dispositional and categorical properties. An X/Y distinction is hyperintensional iff there are cointensional properties P and Q, such that P is an X-property, whereas Q is a Y-property. Many accounts of metaphysical distinctions among properties presuppose that such distinctions are non-hyperintensional. In this paper, I call this presupposition into question. I develop a sufficient condition for the hyperintensionality of X/Y distinctions and argue that this condition is satisfied by a number of standard classifications of properties. It follows that non-hyperintensional analyses of distinctions among properties are harder to defend than is often assumed.
Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.
Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic finks and when not.
Attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for demarcating ‘dispositional’ predicates (such as ‘is fragile’) from other predicates are generally acknowledged to fail. This leaves unresolved the question of what it is about paradigm instances of dispositional predicates in virtue of which their application to an object constitutes a disposition ascription. This essay proposes that dispositional predicates are generally derived from ergative verbs, those verbs that allow for certain entailments from transitive to intransitive forms (as ‘Sam broke the glass’ entails ‘The glass broke’). The connection between disposition ascriptions and ergativity is shown to have consequences for the metaphysics of dispositions.
Saul Kripke identifies the ‘rule-following problem’ as finding an answer to the question: What makes it the case that a speaker means one thing rather than another by a linguistic expression? In a series of important papers in the 1980s and 1990s, Crispin Wright and Paul Boghossian argued that this problem could be neutralized via the adoption of a form of non-reductionism about content. In recent work on ‘blind rule-following’, however, both now argue that even if a non-reductionist view can be defended in such a way as to neutralize the challenge posed by Kripke's Wittgenstein, a more fundamental problem about rule-following remains unsolved. Against this, I will argue that if, courtesy of a non-reductionist conception of content, we can successfully meet the challenge posed by Kripke's Wittgenstein, there are no further problems about rule-following along the lines of those recently suggested by Boghossian and Wright.
Mainstream analytic epistemology regards knowledge as the property of individuals, rather than groups. Drawing on insights from the reality of knowledge production and dissemination in the sciences, I argue, from within the analytic framework, that this view is wrong. I defend the thesis of ‘knowledge-level justification communalism’, which states that at least some knowledge, typically knowledge obtained from expert testimony, is the property of a community and possibly none of its individual members, in that only the community or some members of it collectively possess knowledge-level justification for its individual members’ beliefs. I address several objections that individuals, qua individuals, have or are able to acquire knowledge-level justification for all the beliefs they obtain from expert testimony. I argue that the problem I identify with individualism is invariant under any specific account of justification, internalist or externalist.
‘Conciliationism’ is the view that disagreement with qualified disputants gives us a powerful reason for doubting our disputed views, a reason that will often be sufficient to defeat what would otherwise be strong evidential justification for our position. Conciliationism is disputed by many qualified philosophers, a fact that has led many to conclude that conciliationism is self-defeating. After examining one prominent response to this challenge and finding it wanting, I develop a fresh approach to the problem. I identify two levels at which one may show epistemic deference—the level of one's credences and the level of one's reasoning—and show that in disagreements over conciliationism, deference at one level results in non-deference at the other. A commitment to epistemic deference therefore does not provide a rational reason to reduce confidence when conciliationism itself is disputed. After presenting the case for ‘resolute conciliationism’, I address two objections.
Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem, focusing on an example in which favouring something makes that very thing unfitting to favour. This example creates deeper challenges than those raised by the wrong kind of reasons problem for the fitting attitude analysis, challenges that can only be addressed by allowing problematic psychological attitudes to figure in the fitting attitude analysis and by adopting implausibly specific commitments in modal metaphysics and epistemology. The paper concludes by showing that defenders of the fitting attitude analysis must make unappealing trade-offs between the substantiveness and the correctness of the analysis.
Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a naïve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant's account of hallucination and argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naïve realist sense. Kant's theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature.
Three popular views regarding the modal status of the laws of nature are discussed: Humean Supervenience, nomic necessitation, and scientific/dispositional essentialism. These views are examined especially with regard to their take on the apparent modal force of laws and their ability to explain that modal force. It will be suggested that none of the three views, at least in their strongest form, can be maintained if some laws are metaphysically necessary, but others are metaphysically contingent. Some reasons for thinking that such variation in the modal status of laws exists will be presented with reference to physics. This drives us towards a fourth, hybrid view, according to which there are both necessary and contingent laws. The prospects for such a view are studied.
Most people seem to believe that it is wrong to cause needless suffering and death to non-human animals, and yet most people also contribute to the needless suffering and death of a great many animals. If speciesism is understood as a psychological prejudice—the tendency of an individual human agent to disregard the interests of animals—then this fact is extremely difficult to explain. I argue that once speciesism is understood structurally—as a matter of injustice rather than a matter of interpersonal wrongdoing or individual prejudice—the project of explaining how so many humans are implicated in animal suffering becomes much more tractable. Drawing on the work of feminist theorists such as Sally Haslanger and Catharine MacKinnon, I suggest a way of reconceiving the question of the moral status of animals as a political question about the construction of animals and animality through our social, cultural, legal, and linguistic practices.
Απαντάται για πρώτη φορά στην Ιλιάδα (0-412) : ''...που με την ορμηνία της Αθηνάς κατέχει καλά την τέχνη του όλη...'' .. Η αρχική λοιπόν σημασία της λέξης δηλώνει την ΓΝΩΣΗ και την τέλεια ΚΑΤΟΧΗ οποιασδήποτε τέχνης. .. Κατά τον Ησύχιο σήμαινε την τέχνη των μουσικών και των ποιητών. Αργότερα,διευρύνθηκε η σημασία της και δήλωνε : την βαθύτερη κατανόηση των πραγμάτων και την υψηλού επιπέδου ικανότητα αντιμετώπισης και διευθέτησης των προβλημάτων της ζωής. .. Δεν είναι προ'ι'όν μάθησης αλλά γνώση πηγαία που αναβρύζει από την πνευματικότητα του κατόχου της. "ΣΟΦΟΣ Ο ΠΟΛΛΑ ΕΙΔΩΣ" λέει ο Πίνδαρος ..
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