How We Fight: Ethics in War
Cawston, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Varieties of Logic
Hjortland, O., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically
Timmerman, T., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy
Miller, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Interactive Democracy: The Social Roots of Global Justice
Buckley, M., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
WHY COMPANIONS IN GUILT ARGUMENTS STILL WORK: REPLY TO COWIE
Das, R., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
An increasingly popular response to moral error theory is to deploy a ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) strategy. The basic idea behind this strategy is to show that moral error theoretic arguments prove too much: if sound, they support an (implausible) error theoretic position in areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie has recently defended the very strong claim that CG arguments cannot work. The basic problem, he thinks, is that there is a tension between two key premises in any CG argument. I argue here that Cowie fails to show how, exactly, one of the CG arguments he takes as his target (Rowland) does not work, specifically, how it is unsound. I go on to show why the tension Cowie thinks is fatal to CG arguments evades the fundamental issue at stake in contemporary debates over moral error theory, namely, whether categorical normative reasons exist.Philosophizing About Sex
Archard, D., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation
Leininger, L., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
THE MANY (YET FEW) FACES OF DEFLATIONISM
Wyatt, J., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
It's often said that according to deflationary theories of truth, truth is not a ‘substantial’ property. While this is a fine slogan, it is far from transparent what deflationists mean (or ought to mean) in saying that truth is ‘insubstantial’. Focusing so intently upon the concept of truth and the word ‘true’, I argue, deflationists and their critics have been insufficiently attentive to a host of metaphysical complexities that arise for deflationists in connection with the property of truth. My aim is to correct several misunderstandings as to what deflationists are after here—including some harboured by deflationists themselves—and to offer an account of the commitments about truth's nature that they ought to undertake. In developing this account, I focus particularly upon the issue of what metaphysics of truth a Horwichian minimalist ought to adopt.THINKING ANIMALS AND THE THINKING PARTS PROBLEM
Watson, J. L., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
There is a thinking animal in your chair and you are the only thinking thing in your chair; therefore, you are an animal. So goes the main argument for animalism, the Thinking Animal Argument. But notice that there are many other things that might do our thinking: heads, brains, upper halves, left-hand complements, right-hand complements, and any other object that has our brain as a part. The abundance of candidates for the things that do our thinking is known as the Thinking Parts Problem. Animalists who endorse the Thinking Animal Argument must solve this problem by giving reasons for privileging the animal over its rivals. In order to meet this challenge, some animalists have argued that the best solution is a biological minimalist one. In what follows, I argue that every extant biological minimalist solution to the Thinking Parts Problem fails.The Logical Structure of Kinds
Hawley, K., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness
Bermudez, J. L., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
RESCUING COMPANIONS IN GUILT ARGUMENTS
Rowland, R., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.MORAL REASONS, EPISTEMIC REASONS AND RATIONALITY
Worsnip, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
It is standard, both in the philosophical literature and in ordinary parlance, to assume that one can fall short of responding to all one's moral reasons without being irrational. Yet when we turn to epistemic reasons, the situation could not be more different. Most epistemologists take it as axiomatic that for a belief to be rational is for it to be well supported by epistemic reasons. We find ourselves with a striking asymmetry, then, between the moral and epistemic domains concerning what is taken for granted about whether failures to respond to reasons are failures of rationality. My aim in this paper is to interrogate this asymmetry, and ultimately to argue that the asymmetry is groundless. Instead, I will offer an error theory to explain the asymmetry in intuitions (away). This error theory suggests that we should amend the conventional wisdom about the relationship between epistemic reasons and rationality.Probability in the Philosophy of Religion
Leal, D., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
COMMON-SENSE FUNCTIONALISM AND THE EXTENDED MIND
Wadham, J., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
The main claim of this paper is that Andy Clark's most influential argument for ‘the extended mind thesis’ (EM henceforth) fails. Clark's argument for EM assumes that a certain form of common-sense functionalism is true. I argue, contra Clark, that the assumed brand of common-sense functionalism does not imply EM. Clark's argument also relies on an unspoken, undefended and optional assumption about the nature of mental kinds—an assumption denied by the very common-sense functionalists on whom Clark's argument draws. I also critique Mark Sprevak's reductio of Clark's argument. Sprevak contends that Clark's argument does not merely entail EM; it entails an extended mind thesis so strong as to be absurd. He goes on to claim that Clark's argument should properly be viewed as a reductio of the very common-sense functionalism on which it depends. Sprevak's argument shares the flaw that afflicts Clark's argument, or so I claim.Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity
Lazenby, H., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Emotion and Value
Hansen, M. K., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Motivational Internalism
Suikkanen, J., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
WHY ETHICS AND AESTHETICS ARE PRACTICALLY THE SAME
Ridley, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Discussion of the relations between ethics and aesthetics has tended to focus on issues concerning judgement: for example, philosophers have often asked whether, or to what extent, ethical considerations of one sort or another should inform aesthetic verdicts. Much less discussed, however, have been the relations between these two domains in their practical aspects. In this paper, I try to defuse a cluster of reasons for believing that practical competence in the ethical domain and practical competence in the aesthetic domain must be understood as importantly, or structurally, distinct from one another.NON-DESCRIPTIVE NEGATION FOR NORMATIVE SENTENCES
Alwood, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Frege-Geach worries about embedding and composition have plagued metaethical theories like emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. The sharpened point of such criticism has come to focus on whether negation and inconsistency have to be understood in descriptivist terms. Because they reject descriptivist semantics, these theories must offer a non-standard account of the meanings of ethical and normative sentences and their semantic relations. This paper fills out such a solution to the negation problems, following some of the original emotivist ideas about the interplay of interests in conversation. We communicate both to share information and coordinate our actions, and we use distinctively normative language like deontic ‘must’ and ‘may’ to negotiate what people are to do. The kinds of disagreement involved in this interplay can help explain negation and inconsistency, in a dynamic semantic system that develops the scorekeeping model of conversation. This clarifies the significance of Frege-Geach worries for nondescriptive semantics.DEFLATIONISM, CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATION, AND THE TRUTH ASYMMETRY
Liggins, D., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Ascriptions of truth give rise to an explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we accept ‘is true because Rex is barking’ but reject ‘Rex is barking because is true’. Benjamin Schnieder and other philosophers have recently proposed a fresh explanation of this asymmetry: they have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source. The main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists. I offer a pair of objections to the proposal and defend them from counter-objections. To conclude, I discuss how else to explain the asymmetry, and set out the implications for deflationism and correspondence theories of truth. Turtles All the Way Down: On Plato's Theaetetus, a Commentary and Translation
Rowe, C., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
ACTION UNIFIED
Levy, Y., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Mental acts are conspicuously absent from philosophical debates over the nature of action. A typical protagonist of a typical scenario is far more likely to raise her arm or open the window than she is to perform a calculation in her head or talk to herself silently. One possible explanation for this omission is that the standard ‘causalist’ account of action, on which acts are analysed in terms of mental states causing bodily movements, faces difficulties in accommodating some paradigmatic cases of mental action—or so I shall argue. After drawing out these objections to causalism, I outline a more promising approach. Building on previous work, I show how the approach I favour, on which the attempt to analyse action is dispensed with, provides a unified account of both mental and physical action.JUST WAR AND ROBOTS' KILLINGS
Simpson, T. W., Muller, V. C., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
May lethal autonomous weapons systems—‘killer robots’—be used in war? The majority of writers argue against their use, and those who have argued in favour have done so on a consequentialist basis. We defend the moral permissibility of killer robots, but on the basis of the non-aggregative structure of right assumed by Just War theory. This is necessary because the most important argument against killer robots, the responsibility trilemma proposed by Rob Sparrow, makes the same assumptions. We show that the crucial moral question is not one of responsibility. Rather, it is whether the technology can satisfy the requirements of fairness in the redistribution of risk. Not only is this possible in principle, but some killer robots will actually satisfy these requirements. An implication of our argument is that there is a public responsibility to regulate killer robots’ design and manufacture.COGNITIVISM, SIGNIFICANCE AND SINGULAR THOUGHT
Goodman, R., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
This paper has a narrow and a broader target. The narrow target is a particular version of what I call the mental-files conception of singular thought (MFC), proposed by Robin Jeshion, and known as cognitivism. The broader target is the MFC in general. I give an argument against Jeshion's view, which gives us preliminary reason to reject the MFC more broadly. I argue Jeshion's theory of singular thought should be rejected because the central connection she makes between significance and singularity does not hold. However, my argument grants Jeshion's claim that there is a connection between significance and file-thinking (for some kinds of files). The upshot is not only that we have reason to reject Jeshion's significance constraint on singular thought, but that we have reason to question the connection made by MFC proponents between file-thinking and singularity.MILL'S ANTIREALISM
Macleod, C., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
One of Mill's primary targets, throughout his work, is intuitionism. In this paper, I distinguish two strands of intuitionism, against which Mill offers separate arguments. The first strand, a priorism, makes an epistemic claim about how we come to know norms. The second strand, ‘first principle pluralism’, makes a structural claim about how many fundamental norms there are. In this paper, I suggest that one natural reading of Mill's argument against first principle pluralism is incompatible with the naturalism that drives his argument against a priorism. It must, therefore, be discarded. Such a reading, however, covertly attributes Mill realist commitments about the normative. These commitments are unnecessary. To the extent that Mill's argument against first principle pluralism is taken seriously, I suggest, it is an argument that points towards Mill as having an antirealist approach to the normative.IDIOSYNCRATIC PERCEPTION
French, C., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyncratic perception. I defend the relational view in response to this problem.RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM (AND KANTIAN CONTRACTUALISM) AT TOP RATES
Toppinen, T., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
According to one form of rule consequentialism, RC, everyone ought to follow the rules whose universal acceptance would make things go best. According to one form of Kantian contractualism, KC, everyone ought to follow the rules whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. RC and KC are almost universally rejected on the basis of their appealing to universal acceptance rate. I argue that given the inclusion, into our value theory, of what Philip Pettit calls ‘robustly demanding goods’, RC and KC probably survive the most important objections of the relevant kind: the New Ideal World Objection and the Objection from Reprobates and Amoralists. If RC and KC can survive these objections, this is good news for those sympathetic to rule consequentialism and Kantian contractualism, as the alternative formulations of these views, which appeal to lower or variable acceptance rates, are widely agreed to face severe problems of their own.Physical Realization
McQueen, K. J., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Getting Causes from Powers
Hennig, B., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Philosophers in the Republic: Plato's Two Paradigms
Connell, S., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Subjectivity After Wittgenstein; The Post-Cartesian Subject and the 'Death of Man'
Checkland, D., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Articulating Medieval Logic
Uckelman, S. L., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability
Carruth, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
One powerful argument for dualism is provided by Chalmers: the ‘zombie’ or conceivability argument. This paper aims to establish that if one adopts the ‘Powerful Qualities’ account of properties developed by Martin and Heil, this argument can be resisted at the first premise: the claim that zombies are conceivable is, by the lights of Chalmers’ own account of conceivability, false.The Powerful Qualities account is outlined. Chalmers’ argument, and several distinctions which underlie it, are explained. It is argued that to make sense of the claim that zombies are conceivable, some account of properties must be given. The paper's central claim is presented and defended from potential responses: given the Powerful Qualities view, zombies are in fact inconceivable. Finally, an error theory is presented, which offers an explanation of why so many have taken the conceivability of zombies to be unproblematic, and the view is briefly contrasted with Russellian monism.Category Mistakes
Bateman, J. A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Persons, Animals, Ourselves
Sutton, C. S., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
The Nature of Philosophical Problems: Their Causes and Implications
Cahill, K., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTRACTUAL SLAVERY
Frederick, D., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
In contrast to eminent historical philosophers, almost all contemporary philosophers maintain that slavery is impermissible. In the enthusiasm of the Enlightenment, a number of arguments gained currency which were intended to show that contractual slavery is not merely impermissible but impossible. Those arguments are influential today in moral, legal and political philosophy, even in discussions that go beyond the issue of contractual slavery. I explain what slavery is, giving historical and other illustrations. I examine the arguments for the impossibility of contractual slavery propounded in the Enlightenment and their offspring expounded in recent writings, including those by Barnett, Cassirer, Ellerman, Rawls, Roberts-Thomson, Satz and Steiner. I show that they involve confusions between abilities and rights, free will and freedom, directing and doing, what may be true sequentially and what may be true simultaneously, default rights and universal rights, impermissibility and impossibility, and metaphorical and literal uses of language.Intentionality and the Myths of the Given
Levine, S., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Doing and Being. An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta
Hennig, B., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
The Norm of Belief
Matheson, J., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism
Yetter-Chappell, H., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Hegel and the Metaphysical Frontiers of Political Theory
Smetona, M. J., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Moral Failure: On The Impossible Demands of Morality
Archer, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the Good Life
Sonny Elizondo, E., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience
Howard, S. A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Beyond Consequentialism
Thomas, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Introspection and Consciousness
Roche, M., Roche, W., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
A Philosophical Guide to Chance
Miller, J. T. M., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention
Cawston, A., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies
Mulgan, T., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Being Realistic about Reasons
Wedgwood, R., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Distant Strangers: Ethics, Psychology, and Global Poverty
Brownlee, K., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Varieties of Presence
Madary, M., 2015-09-24 16:31:52 PM
Πέμπτη 24 Σεπτεμβρίου 2015
The Philosophical Quarterly
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