Philosophy of Religion

• Editorial preface

  2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM

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• George Berkeley’s proof for the existence of God

  2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  Most philosophers have given up George Berkeley’s proof for the existence of God as a lost cause, for in it, Berkeley seems to conclude more than he actually shows. I defend the proof by showing that its conclusion is not (as is often supposed) the thesis that an infinite and perfect God exists, but rather the much weaker thesis that a very powerful God exists and that this God’s agency is pervasive in nature. This interpretation, I argue, is consistent with the texts. It is also an important component of Berkeley’s philosophical project, which consists of launching many small arguments (rather than one large argument) against his philosophical and theological opponents.
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• Gordon Graham: Wittgenstein & Natural Religion

  2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM

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• Religion for naturalists

  2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  Some naturalists feel an affinity with some religions, or with a particular religion. They may have previously belonged to it, and/or been raised in it, and/or be close to people who belong to it, and/or simply feel attracted to its practices, texts and traditions. This raises the question of whether and to what extent a naturalist can lead the life of a religious believer. The sparse literature on this topic focuses on (a position recognizable as) religious fictionalism. I also frame the debate in these terms. I ask what religious fictionalism might amount to, reject some possible versions of it and endorse a different one. I then examine the existing proposals, by Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Lipton, Andrew Eshleman and Howard Wettstein, and show that even on my version of religious fictionalism, much of what has been described by these authors is still possible.
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• Did god know it? God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness

  2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  A common type of argument against the existence of God is to argue that certain essential features associated with the existence of God are inconsistent with certain other features to be found in the actual world. (Cf. Göcke (2013) for an analysis of the different ways to deploy the term “God” in philosophical and theological discourse and for an analysis of the logical form of arguments for and against the existence of God.) A recent example of this type of argument against the existence of God is based on the assumption that there are random processes or chancy states of affairs in the actual world that contradict God being absolute sovereign over his creation: Chancy states of affairs are said to entail a denial of divine providence or omniscience. (For instance, Smith (1993, p. 195) argues that “classical Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with theism due to the unpredictable nature of the Big Bang singularity.”) More often than not, however, this apparent conflict is formulated only intuitively and lacks sufficient conceptual clarification of the crucial terms involved. As a consequence, it is seldom clear where the conflict really lies. In what follows, I first provide a brief analysis of chance and randomness before I turn to cosmological and evolutionary arguments against the existence of God that in some way or other are based on chance and randomness. I end by way of comparing three popular conceptions of God as regards their ability to deal with God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness. Neither classical theism, nor open theism, nor indeed process panentheism has difficulties in accounting for God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness.
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• Classical and revisionary theism on the divine as personal: a rapprochement?

  2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  To claim that the divine is a person or personal is, according to Swinburne, ‘the most elementary claim of theism’ (The coherence of theism, 1993, p. 101). I argue that, whether the classical theist’s concept of the divine as a person or personal is construed as an analogy or a metaphor, or a combination of the two, analysis necessitates qualification of that concept such that any differences between the classical theist’s concept of the divine as a person or personal and revisionary interpretations of that concept are merely superficial. Thus, either the classical theist has more in common with revisionary theism than he/she might care to admit, or classical theism is a multi-faceted position which encompasses interpretations which some might regard as revisionist. This article also explores and employs the use of a gender-neutral pronoun in talk about God.
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• Indexicality, phenomenality and the trinity

  2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  I utilize recent work in analytic epistemology on the notion of essentially indexical knowledge, as well as Marion’s notion of saturated phenomenality, to ground the psychological model of the Trinity. I argue that classical theism implies that God is essentially omniscient. This omniscience entails complete self-knowledge on God’s part. There are, however, truths about God’s consciousness that are reducible neither to concepts nor to 1st person experience. These are the truths about how God’s presence is perceived from a 2nd person perspective. In order for God to know such truths about himself, he would have to experience himself as both an ‘I’ and a ‘You.’ Thus, God must exist as a being with multiple subjective centers of consciousness.
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• Did god do it? Metaphysical models and theological hermeneutics

  2015-10-01 02:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  I start by way of clarifying briefly the problem of special divine intervention. Once this is done, I argue that laws of nature are generalizations that derive from the dispositional behaviour of natural kinds. Based on this conception of laws of nature I provide a metaphysical model according to which God can realize acts of special divine providence by way of temporarily changing the dispositions of natural entities. I show that this model does not contradict scientific practice and is consistent with the assumption that the physical realm is causally closed. I then argue that prima facie any putative candidate for an act of God could also be seen as a random event or as indicating that there is something wrong with our formulation of the corresponding law of nature. While there is no sufficient philosophical or scientific reason to prefer one of these models, I argue that there are sufficient and legitimate theological reasons to endorse a framework in which at least the obtaining of some anomic states of affairs is seen as the effect of special divine intervention. Doing so, theology has the hermeneutic resources to uncover a dimension of meaningful reality, which without faith could not be seen.
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• Counterfactuals of divine freedom

  2015-09-21 03:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom (CDFs) are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God’s will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus she cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize.
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• Yet another new cosmological argument

  2015-08-09 03:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  I argue that the existence of a necessary concrete being can be derived from an exceedingly weak causal principle coupled with two contingent truths one of which falls out of very popular positions in contemporary analytic metaphysics. I then show that the argument resists a great many objections commonly lodged against natural theological arguments of the cosmological variety.
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• Divine hiddenness and the one sheep

  2015-08-06 03:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  Next to the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness has become the most prominent argument for atheism in the current literature. The basic idea is that if God really existed, He would make sure that anyone able and willing to engage in relationship with Him (i.e., who are nonresistant towards Him) would have a rationally indubitable belief in Him at all times (since stable belief is a necessary precondition for a long-term, loving relationship). But as a matter of fact we see that the world includes nonresistant nonbelievers. Therefore God doesn’t exist. Here I propose a reply to the problem that shifts focus from the nonresistant nonbelievers to those who are resistant. I claim (along with Morris (Making sense of it all: Pascal and the meaning of life. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1992), Howard-Snyder (Can J Philos 26:433–453, 1996), and others) that for many such people, having God’s reality forced upon them unwillingly might result in significant spiritual/moral harm, inhibiting their ability to develop a positive relationship with God. (I also respond to Schellenberg’s (Relig Stud 41:201–215, 2005a) general critique of any strategy that references the notion of God’s proper non-revelation to the resistant.) If this is true, it could help explain why God refrains from revealing Himself in a rationally indubitable manner not only to the resistant, but even to the nonresistant. Why? Because it may be that under present circumstances God is actually more concerned about the welfare of the resistant than of the willing; and revealing Himself to all of the willing could actually result in the truth of theism being forced on the resistant.
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• Terry F. Godlove, Kant and the meaning of religion

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

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• Fiona Ellis, God, Value, and Nature

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

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• Editorial preface

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

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• The epistemology of divine conceptualism

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  Divine conceptualism takes all abstract objects to be propositions in the mind of God. I focus here on necessary propositions and contemporary claims that the laws of logic, understood as necessarily true propositions, provide us with an epistemic bridge to theological predication—specifically, to the claim that God exists. I argue that when contemporary versions of DC say ‘G/god’ they merely rename the notion of necessary truth, and fail to refer to God. Given that God is incomprehensible, epistemic access to the state of propositions in the mind of God is extremely limited.
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• Trent Dougherty, The problem of animal pain: a theodicy for all creatures great and small

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

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• Does cognitive humility lead to religious tolerance? Reflections on Craig versus Quinn

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  We’ve all heard the familiar saying, “ignorance is bliss.” It may also be true that “ignorance is intolerant.” But it seems to be at least sometimes true that intolerance is produced by something else: overconfidence in the truthfulness of one’s own opinions. Awareness of and avoidance of such overconfidence may be a path towards tolerating those with whom one disagrees. And this could be true in religion as well as in other areas of belief. In his 2005 article “On Religious Diversity and Tolerance,” Philip L. Quinn argues that awareness of religious diversity, coupled with various other considerations, leads to a degree of modesty about the truth claims of one’s religion, and that such modesty leads to tolerance of other religions. However, in his 2007 paper “Is Uncertainty a Sound Foundation for Religious Tolerance,” William Lane Craig takes issue with Quinn’s position, arguing that Quinn’s “radical skepticism” about religious beliefs is not warranted and that “doubt” is not a sound foundation for tolerance. In this paper I contend that cognitive humility is warranted, that it is not a form of skepticism, that it does not entail doubt, and that it may contribute significantly to religious tolerance. I defend Quinn’s thesis by offering a version that is based on certain epistemic considerations that help the reader to see Quinn’s argument in a new and strengthened light. I then argue that Quinn’s approach to tolerance has at least one significant advantage over the approach proposed by Craig: acceptability to all religious traditions.
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• Atheism and epistemic justification

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  In a recent article in this journal, Andrew Johnson seeks to defend the “New Atheism” against several objections. We provide a philosophical assessment of his defense of contemporary atheistic arguments that are said to amount to bifurcation fallacies. This point of discussion leads to our critical discussion of the presumption of atheism and the epistemic justification of atheism.
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• Schopenhauer on religious pessimism

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  Schopenhauer’s bifurcation between optimistic and pessimistic religions is made, so I argue here, by means of five criteria: to perceive of existence as punishment, to believe that salvation is not attained through ‘works’, to preach compassion so as to lead towards ascetics, to manifest an aura of mystery around religious doctrines and to, at some deep level, admit to the allegorical nature of religious creeds. By clearly showing what makes up the ‘pessimism’ of a ‘pessimistic religion’, Schopenhauer’s own philosophical pessimism can be clarified since he posits a strict correlation between the truth of (proper) philosophy and (pessimistic) religion. Accordingly, Schopenhauer’s pessimism is by means of this process clarified as non-radical and providing a genuine ‘highest good’ that is more than absolute denial.
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• Why pan-dispositionalism is incompatible with metaphysical naturalism

  2015-08-01 03:00:00 AM

  Abstract

  Pan-dispositionalism is one of the major theories in current analytic metaphysics concerning dispositional properties (i.e., causal powers / capacities / abilities) and how they relate to categorical properties (i.e., non-dispositional properties, paradigm cases of which include shape, size, structure etc.). According to pan-dispositionalists, all fundamental properties are dispositional in nature, such that any supposed categorical properties are either unreal or reducible in some way to the dispositional. I argue that if pan-dispositionalism is true then metaphysical naturalism (roughly the view that the only objects in existence are physical objects) is false. To the extent that one finds pan-dispositionalism a plausible theory, one ought to question the truth of metaphysical naturalism. On the other hand, if one is a committed metaphysical naturalist, one ought to question the truth of pan-dispositionalism. Either way we get a significant result, of interest both to those working in metaphysics and to those working in philosophy of religion.
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